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One of the disadvantages of coming to [speak atl
this point in a session that has been as well and as
intelligently populated as this one, is that there is not
a lot left to say, but I would like to offer a couple of
thoughts. The perspectives from the practice from
which Iwork is one that has in the past been defended
by vigorous environmental, criminal and civil enforcement actions. 11 havel worked with companies to
achieve compliance to avoid the onset of those kinds
of actions. Having had the pnvilege of building a couple of dozen environmental management systems
IEMSsl in Europe, the States, and the Pacific Rim, I
never have the view that lit] is prudent to expose an
organization who I represent as their environmental
lawyer to compliance enforcement nsks in the course
of doing their corrective action work.
But the content, the focus of this symposium is.
Does the environmental management systems audit,
associated within EMS of its own nature require.
necessitate, is it advanced by an audit pnvilege? And I
think the answer is no, It is inimical to the notion of an
environmental management system that is designed
to assist an organization to distribute the environmental compliance function to every single person in the
organization so that each person takes personal
responsibility and understands the nsk of environmental performance and environmental impact. It is
inimical to that to hold environmental management
systems audits close to the vest, which you must do in
order to protect and maintain the privilege.
It makes no sense in an area where you are trying
to distribute responsibility broadly in the organization
to privilege that environmental management systems
audit. The compliance audit is a different issue, but I
lust want to say that we heard from the Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assessment this mornIng that an environmental management system is not
a guarantee of compliance. As though that is an indictment of an environmental management system, Well
S
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guess what? All the laws we have on the books
are not guarantees of compliance. And
enforcement is not a guarantee of compliance
and criminal prosecution is not a guarantee of
compliance. All of these things do not achieve
100 percent compliance. So it should not be
that EMS is held to the standard that because
it isn't a guarantee of compliance, it somehow
has a different status in the game of solving
environmental risk, because that is what the
game is about. Greg Chambers lof Quantum
Corporation] was right, the issue is not compliance. The public trust of regulators to the
public they represent has nothing to do with
compliance. The public trust is environmental
protection. And that is the objective and decision making process that organizations go
through.
It was suggested by the last panel that
there has never been any abuse of the information in an environmental compliance audit
when put in the hands of the prosecutors.
There is some evidence to suggest that is true,
there is some evidence to suggest that it is not
true. But let's assume that it is true: It's no
more sensible to think that a moratorium on
enforcement is going to encourage bad behavior. I disagree here, at my peril, with Gordon
[Atkinsonl,lof Cooley Godwardl but I do disagree, because when an organization has no
umbrella protection and no moratorium but
they find out that they have compliance problems, they impose their own moratorium. The
psychology is regulators could be here tomorrow. And if you think they stand around and
wait and say, "Oh gosh, it will be really nice
because we've got a couple of years before they
come." I tell you, from the perspective of someone who has been inside dozens of organizations, they don't. They move with all speed,
and if the moratorium were in place it wouldn't
be any different.
It was also suggested, during the course of
the last panel that somehow the environmental interest community, NGOs [non-governmental organizationsl and folks who represent
[those] adversely affected by environmental
risk do things which are inimical to the organization's bottom line. Wrong! The bottom line
of the organization is perfectly consistent with
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and completely aligned with the interests of
people who don't want to be harmed by toxic
gas releases, groundwater contamination and
extinction of endangered species, Because
when a company pollutes, when a company
wastes, when a company general:es products
that have wastes associated witI' them, they
waste money and they hurt their ability to sell
to customers and customers know that. If I am
running a company, and I am buying a variety
of supplies and I know that I am managing
environmental risk poorly or irefficiently I
know I am spending more money that I should
and'I know that of my suppliers, And the real
issue is, not that it's the law that I should do
this, the real issue is if you are not doing right,
you are not going to sell products. Your competitors are going to knock your socks off.
So I want to close with two propositions
that generate from the source that the audit
privilege, whether it complies to compliance
audits or EMS audits, is a symptom. I want to
draw the focus back for a minute; we need to
attack the illness, not the symptom.
Regulators have done a pretty good [jobi
at creating a marketplace of regulations. The
Environmental Leadership, Project XL and
those kinds of things are alternatives for companies that pursue environmental leadership.
But regulators need to do a better iob of creating a broader market place of options for companies that are trying to do the right thing.
There are very few companies who actually try
to do the wrong thing, contrary to the view of
most folks who are in the public interest and
NGO community. Companies don't exist for
the purposes of generating wastes as a byproduct. They exist for the purpose of generating
products and wastes are a byproduct, and one
that wastes money and resources. And so we
need to redesign and expand the tools available in the regulatory market, treat regulatory
behavior as though it was a market. Market
alternatives have been somewhat well developed. Well, now we need to expand the market
one step further.
[We need to createl business plans Ifor
environmental regulation]. It is fear that keeps
companies from doing audits. We have sat
inside companies and had the in-house envi-
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ronmental lawyers and the in-house CEOs and
the in-house environmental managers saying,
"we are not going to audit, it's too dangerous,"
in states where there is a privilege, just as they
say in states where there is not a privilege. It is
fear, it is fear of uncertainty.
One of the fundamental uncertainties is
that we have no idea where the agencies are
going next. The rulemaking, that I am sure is
imminent on endocrine interrupters is a very
good example. Bob Stevens talked earlier
about policy of the DTSC [Department of Toxic
Substances Control]. What is the environmental protection policy of the state of California?
What are its five top issues? We don't know
where they are going to regulate next. But if
they give us a business plan, if they give the
regulated community a business plan, we can
target our behavior and measure it against
their actions and sync-up our behavior with
their actions, and those can attack the fundamental risks, the most important risks, to the
environment and not whether the label is the
right size.
So one proposed approach is to create a
business plan and a market model for regulators. Nothing is put at risk. None of the environmental protections mechanisms in place
would be removed. And the key here is no lifting of the environmental compliance burdens
on companies would occur. Regulated entities
thereby can plan for change. Regulators set
broad policy goals. For example, we are going
to be out of chlorinates, completely, within
twenty years. Period. And instead of legislating
on that and regulating, and writing pages and
pages and pages of regulations year after year
as the science gets better, they can tell industry that is the objective. And then what happens is industry, to pick up another point that
was made earlier, works in a cooperative way
with all of the stakeholders to develop the
strategies to achieve that objective. Industrial
sectors or regions cooperate, [but] all stake
holders are involved in developing the logistics. The broad policy goal of what we are going
to do in twenty years is announced as a top priority, [then] you have a second, a third and a
fourth priority. It's a business model for regulators and it doesn't abandon a single thing

about what the people who live next door to an
industrial plant which produces toxic gases, or
that generates biotechnology waste or textile
or pulp waste, are relying on their environmental regulators to do It doesn't put that at risk at
all. And, lit usesl a twenty or fifty year planning
horizon rather than next year. with mechanisms in place to deal with new discoveries
and methodologies that occur within the gambit of that twenty years For example, if we figure out that there is a better technology that
can eliminate chlorine in the next five years, we
change the plan But, in the meantime, the
logistics of solving the problem are left to
industry
The other idea that I want to advance is a
different model of enforcement Today what
happens is, a major fine is announced, a multimillion dollar fine, and, of course, a press
conference is held, "Largest Fine in EPA
History Levied Against Scum Corp_" and under

those circumstances it is viewed as a success.
And guess what? That money doesn't do a
thing about the environmental risk and harm
and personal injury to workers and people in
the community It represents a penalty, a disincentive. Companies behave very badly under
those circumstances They need positive, pull
incentives, and again, Iwe go] back to the point
Ithatl the fundamental issue is protection of
the environment, not compliance,
So, Ilet's discuss] a new model for enforcement, Let's say we have a violator that is below
the scum line, well below the scum line, the
worst environmental violator you can think of,
a nine, ten, twelve, twenty million dollar fine.
But the press conference this time is lust a little bit different, the violator has had imposed
on him by EPA or DTSC or the Regional Board
or whoever it is, a multimillion dollar fine But,
the regulators have learned that an environmental management system is the way to
attack the business processes that generate
the risks and impacts that cause the harm. And
they have learned, let's hypothesize, that those
business processes, if attacked, can not only
cause compliance to occur but can lift the compliance burden by the organization because
they stop engaging in the behaviors that are
regulated So they say, instead of the fact that
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we are going to collect this multimillion-dollar fine, what we are going to do is work with
the agency and the strike team to develop
EMSs at some point. And during that period
of time, immediate risks to human health and
the environment must cease. But, a plan must
also be developed by the company over time
to correct all of its compliance issues, and
that time period is a year, two years, whatever seems to make sense to all stakeholders.
Let's just pick a three year cycle. During that
period, self-reporting must occur of violations and quarterly reports have to be filed on
progress, and enforcement is a possibility
instantly if there is a risk to human health and
the environment during that period, but until
that period is over there is a limited qualified
amnesty. And also during that period the
EMS comes online. If the results are good, if
the company sticks with it and the EMS is
implemented it will, I really do believe, generate those kinds of results. The business
behaviors that caused the risks and impacts
in compliance will be attacked and if all of
that happens, there will be no fine. The
money that would have been invested in the
fine is invested in the EMS and in other corrective adtions by the company. If the results
don't turn out well or if the company stops
funding the EMS, the fine is [two times the
size as it would otherwise bel. Broad reporting of the processes and results of this
enforcement action occur, and what kind of
incentive does that create within the regulating community? The folks that are near the
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scum line, well below the scum line, and
everybody else. What does that c1o"
Then we have the possibility that rulemaking occurs. Predicated on that, we, see this is a
good model, it makes sense; we go forward on
this basis. We fundamentally change the market for enforcement, and create a pull, rather
than pushing enforcement. It also helps regulators target their resources, Ilikel they need
to. We've heard this repeatedly today.
And finally, this would acknowledge the
competitive value of enforcement, If I am working for a company that is behind the curve and
is trying to get ahead of the curve, and does so
through the investment of resou-ces whether
they discover the problem or it comes to the
light of agencies, I want to be sure that every
competitor of that company has its nose held
to the compliance wall, because that is my
competitive advantage, I am doing it better. I
am making products without those wastes. I
am making products without exposing my

employees. I am making products without
those hazardous materials, I am better supporting my customers. That concept, that shift
of focus, takes away the fear and "incentivises"
the kind of behavior that complihnce is supposed to, but doesn't focus on compliance,
because that is not the game. The game is
environmental protection, and really the game
is environmental quality enhancement. That
will lead to corporate behavior which will make
irrelevant the question of compliance protection under an audit privilege, over the long
term.

